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Spectra Forensics, Investigation Specialist

Case study · Investigations

The Customer That Didn't Exist Yet

A logistics company signed a credit contract with a customer a week before it was incorporated, and paid the customer's sister company to move goods that may never have moved.

  • Sham counterparties & fictitious transactions
  • Proxy, front & related-party vendors
  • Undisclosed conflict of interest
  • Overbilling & inflated invoicing
  • Kickbacks
  • Fund siphoning & round-tripping
  • Forgery & document fabrication
bad-debt exposure
₹1+ Crbad-debt exposure
personal benefit estimated
~₹27 lakhpersonal benefit estimated
of freight advanced against unverified movement
~80%of freight advanced against unverified movement
employees implicated
2employees implicated

01The situation

The company financed both sides of a trade, and was left holding the receivable.

A management audit of a freight brokerage flagged a customer with a large unpaid balance and a transporter that had received heavy advances for the same lanes. The key account manager handled both. Management asked us to find out what had happened.

How it came to us

Exception patterns found during a routine management audit.

02How it worked

  1. 01A known transporter brought the key account manager a new customer. The customer and the transporter shared a director.
  2. 02The company signed the customer on 30-day credit terms and engaged the transporter, paying about 80% of freight in advance.
  3. 03Movement was evidenced by loose, unsigned and partly fabricated consignment notes.
  4. 04Goods effectively moved between related entities while the logistics company financed the trade. The customer then stopped paying.
  5. 05In parallel, the manager inflated vendor quotes before circulating them internally and earned commission through a freight firm in his spouse's name.
How the scheme workedAnonymised
Transporter(introduces customer)'Customer'(shared director)Key accountmanagerLogistics company(credit + advances)Spouse'sfreight firmPaper consignmentnotesUnpaidreceivableintroducessigns up80% advancesbills oncustomer defaultscommission

Swipe sideways to see the whole diagram.

  • Outside parties
  • Insiders involved
  • The organisation
  • Where the money ended up
  • Channels & documents
  • Repeats / feeds back

How it was hidden

One person created consignment notes, booked sales and approved vendor bills. His superior approved without reading the trail. The agreement was backdated, documents were never signed, and the side firm ran from home in the spouse's name.

03The challenge

Establish whether the customer, the transporter and the movements were real, using only the company's own records, with no access to the counterparties.

What made it hard

  • Two group companies
  • Counterparties with shell-like features and wide directorship networks
  • Poor documentation and editable invoices
  • No access to counterparty records

Red flags that were there to see

  • Agreement dated before the customer existed
  • Common director across customer and transporter
  • Supporting documents inconsistent with the counterparty's status
  • Movement records that did not look genuine
  • Service continued after the contract expired
  • Credit to the customer and advances to the transporter at once

04Our approach

  1. Workstream 01

    Document and transaction review

    Contracts, consignment notes, invoices and ledgers across both group companies.

  2. Workstream 02

    Corporate and tax records

    Directorships, incorporation dates and registration status of every counterparty.

  3. Workstream 03

    Transaction analytics

    Tested the movement records for consistency with genuine activity.

  4. Workstream 04

    Personal financial review

    Source-and-application analysis of the manager's accounts.

  5. Workstream 05

    Address and background checks

    Verified counterparty premises and principals.

The breakthrough

Corporate-record checks showed the customer signed its agreement before it legally existed, through a person who later became a director of the transporter. Transaction analytics showed the paperwork could not reflect genuine movements.

05What we found & did

  • A related customer-transporter arrangement was financed by the company.
  • The customer agreement was backdated and signed before incorporation.
  • Consignment notes were deficient or fabricated, with overloading overcharges.
  • An undisclosed side business in the spouse's name was run from office systems.
  • Vendor quotes were inflated before internal circulation.
  • Smaller payments also reached him from transporter-linked firms.

06The impact

Management received a clear account of how the receivable was created, the personal benefit to the employee, an approval lapse by his superior and a second employee moonlighting with vendors, with recommended onboarding and segregation controls.

bad-debt exposure
₹1+ Crbad-debt exposure
personal benefit estimated
~₹27 lakhpersonal benefit estimated
of freight advanced against unverified movement
~80%of freight advanced against unverified movement
employees implicated
2employees implicated

07Lessons for your business

The controls that would have stopped this, or caught it sooner:

  • Verify every new customer and vendor before the first load.
  • Never let one person create consignment notes, book sales and approve vendor bills.
  • Release advances only against independent proof of movement.
  • Stop service when a contract expires.

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